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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Martha Moore appeals, pursuant to her conditional guilty plea to possession of 
methamphetamine, challenging the district court's order denying her motion to 
suppress. She contends that the officers did not have her valid consent to search her 
purse, located in her room, based on their assertion that they were searching pursuant 
to her son's consent to searches as part of the terms of his probation. Since it was not 
reasonable to believe that her son had joint control over either the purse in which the 
methamphetamine was found or the room in which the purse was located, his waiver 
did not give them the lawful authority to search either the purse or the room. Thus, their 
representation of lawful authority to search pursuant to the son's waiver coerced any 
consent Ms. Moore gave at that time. Furthermore, since the officers did not have a 
signed agreement from Ms. Moore consenting to such searches, there is no justification 
for the warrantless search. Thus, the search violated Ms. Moore's constitutional rights 
and the evidence found during that illegal search should be suppressed. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Probation Officer Julie Guiberson, accompanied by four other armed and 
uniformed police officers, went to Ms. Moore's home to execute an arrest warrant on 
Ms. Moore's son, Ryan Mclnelly. (Tr., p.8, Ls.4-5, 22-25; Tr., p.35, Ls.15-23.) Officer 
Guiberson was Mr. Mclnelly's supervising officer while he was on probation. (Tr., p.7, 
Ls.16-19.) While Ms. Moore's home was not Mr. Mclnelly's original residence on 
probation, Officer Guiberson had approved it as a residence for Mr. Mclnelly, and he 
had, to her knowledge, been living there at times. (Tr., p.27, L.25-p.28, L.11; Tr., p.13, 
Ls.8-12.) Officer Guiberson had never asked Ms. Moore to sign a notification regarding 
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the impact of having a probationer living in her house. (Tr., p.27, L.15 - p.28, L.1.) 
Officer Guiberson claimed to have discussed that issue with Ms. Moore (Tr., p.14, Ls.6-
12), but Ms. Moore testified that no such discussion occurred. (Tr., p.80, Ls.6-8) 
The arrest team was met at the door by Ms. Moore's other son, a teenager. 1 
(Tr., p.15, Ls.16-18.) Ms. Moore was in the bathroom. (Tr., p.15, Ls.19-20.) Three of 
the officers entered at the teenage son's invitation and Officer Guiberson waited for 
Ms. Moore to exit the bathroom. (Tr., p.15, Ls.16-21; Tr., p.16, Ls.18-21 (identifying the 
three officers who went into the house).) While waiting, the officers performed a 
protective sweep, but found no one else in the residence. (Tr., p.17, L.16 - p.18, L.1; 
Tr., p.51, Ls.14-17.) When Ms. Moore finished in the bathroom, she tossed her purse 
onto her bed, and went out to meet with the officers. (Tr., p.19, L.6 - p.20, L 14.) Officer 
Guiberson found this conduct to be suspect. (Tr., p.20, Ls.12-23.) 
Ms. Moore informed the officers that Mr. Mclnelly was not at the residence, but 
was out looking for a job. (Tr., p.21, Ls.6-8.) Ms. Moore was able to get a hold of 
Mr. Mclnelly by telephone and Officer Guiberson talked with him, confirmed that he was 
job hunting, and ordered him to meet her at her office in fifteen minutes. (Tr., p.21, 
1 Ms. Moore's teenage son and daughter live with her. (Tr., p.74, Ls.11-22.) 
Ms. Moore's husband would also normally be living in that house, but was incarcerated 
at the time of the search. (Tr., p.100, Ls.17-24.) His belongings were in the room he 
shared with Ms. Moore. (Tr., p.100, Ls.17-18.) And even though there was only one 
bed in Ms. Moore's room (Tr., p.23, L.6), Officer Guiberson mistakenly believed 
Mr. Mclnelly, his son (Ms. Moore's grandson), and Ms. Moore all shared that room. 
(See, e.g., Tr., p.26, Ls.2-3.) Rather, when he was there, Mr. Mclnlley and his son 
would sleep in one of the other rooms, which was furnished for their needs. (Tr., p.100, 
Ls.3-13; see also Tr., p.55, Ls.1-16 (Officer Paula Aldous testifying that she observed 
two beds in another room, in which the teenage son showed her some of Mr. Mclnelly's 
clothes.) However, Ms. Moore indicated that Mr. Mclnelly was staying primarily with 
another of her sons, who had his own residence. (Tr., p.82, L.24 - p.83, L.1.) 
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L.18 - p.22, L.4.) Rather than return to her office for the arranged meeting with 
Mr. Mclnelly, Officer Guiberson decided she wanted to search the house, specifically, 
Ms. Moore's purse. (See Tr., p.22, Ls.5-18.) She claimed that she wanted to be sure 
the house was "a safe place for [Mr. Mclnelly] to live" while on probation (Tr., p.24, Ls.2-
7), even though she was planning on arresting him for violating his probation by using 
drugs. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-6.) 
Ms. Moore testified that Officer Guiberson said she had a right to search the 
whole home pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation. (Tr., p.78, Ls.14-17; 
Tr., p.83, Ls.9-10.) Officer Guiberson testified she could not remember whether she 
had made such statements. (Tr., p.46, Ls.10-15.) However, Officer Tom Foltz (one of 
the three officers who entered the home) testified that Officer Guiberson had given him 
the impression that they had "a combined consent along with the probationary search of 
the home." (Tr., p.64, Ls.21-24.) As a result of Officer Guiberson's claim that she had a 
right to search the home pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation, Ms. Moore 
permitted the search of the home. (See Tr., p.83, Ls.9-10; Tr., p.24, Ls.2-7.) However, 
Ms. Moore maintains that she did not consent to a search of her purse. (Tr., p.99, 
Ls.13-14.) Rather, Ms. Moore testified that Officer Guiberson searched the purse 
without requesting permission to do so. (Tr., p.83, Ls.19-22.) However, Officer 
Guiberson and Officer Aldous testified that Ms Moore consented to that search. 
(Tr., p.25, Ls.17-22; Tr., p.52, L.24 - p.53, L.6.) Officer Guiberson did get Ms. Moore's 
purse from the bedroom, searched it, and found methamphetamine and drug 
paraphernalia in the purse. (Tr., p.26, Ls.3-7.) 
As a result, the State charged Ms. Moore with possession of methamphetamine. 
(R., pp.26-27.) She filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in her purse, claiming 
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the officers had no justification to search the purse. (R., pp.39-40, 44-47.) The State 
responded that Ms. Moore "freely and voluntarily consented to the officer's search of her 
purse and residence," and therefore, the search was valid. (R., pp.52-57.) The district 
court determined, based on the clear weight of the evidence, that Mr. Mclnelly had been 
living in Ms. Moore's home. (R., p.67.) It also ruled that "[a]s [Mr. Mclnelly's] probation 
officer investigating a parole violation involving illegal drug use, Guiberson had the 
authority and responsibility to search the home for evidence relating to possible 
probation violations and to determine if the residence continued to be safe housing." 
(R., p.67.) As a result, it determined that Ms. Moore consented to the search of her 
home and her purse. (R., pp.67-68.) Therefore, it denied the motion to suppress. 
(R., p.68.) 
Ms. Moore entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the 
district court's decision regarding her motion to suppress. (R., p.97.) The district court 
ultimately granted Ms. Moore's request for a withheld judgment and placed her on 
probation for four years. (Tr., p.129, Ls.13-14; R., p.109.) Ms. Moore filed a timely 
notice of appeal pursuant to her conditional guilty plea. (R., pp.116-17.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by not suppressing the evidence found during an illegal 




The District Court Erred By Not Suppressing The Evidence Found During An Illegal 
Search Which Was Conducted Without The Voluntary, Knowing, And Intelligent 
Consent Of Ms. Moore 
A Introduction 
Both the United States and Idaho Constitutions protect against unreasonable, 
searches and seizures. In this case, officers represented that they could search the 
entire residence based on the fact that Mr. Mclnelly had consented to searches 
pursuant to the terms of his probation. That was incorrect and Ms. Moore's subsequent 
acquiescence to that erroneous representation does not constitute voluntary consent. 
Thus, absent a valid waiver of Ms. Moore rights, officers did not have independent 
justification to conduct the warrantless search of her house, much less of her purse 
pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation. Therefore, the district court erred by 
not suppressing the evidence found during the illegal search. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. See, e.g., 
State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 626-27 (Ct. App. 2012). The appellate court accepts 
those findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews 
the application of constitutional principles. Id. "[T]he power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court." Id. 
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C. The Fact That Mr. Mclnelly Was On Probation And Living In Ms. Moore's House 
Did Not Give Officers An Absolute Right To Search The Residence 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 
516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 17; State v. Donato, 135 
Idaho 469, 471 (2001 ). 
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a 
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment unless the State 
demonstrates that one of the exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated 
exceptions to this requirement is applicable to the facts. Id. at 390-91; see also 
State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies to 
Art. I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution). 
When multiple people share a residence, one person's consent to search only 
extends to the property shared in common. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 
U.S. 103, 109 (2006); State v. Robinson, 152 Idaho 961, 965-66 (Ct. App. 2012). This 
consent also extends to the property over which police reasonably, albeit erroneously, 
believe that the person giving the consent has shared control. Id. Whether or not the 
consent-giver has such apparent authority is determined by evaluating the totality of the 
circumstances. Robinson, 152 Idaho at 965-66. As a result, probationers cannot waive 
the rights of other people with whom they cohabitate if the probationer does not have 
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authority over the area or property in question. See, e.g., State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 
728, 730-31 (2002); Robinson, 152 Idaho at 965. As such, Mr. Mclnelly's consent to 
search the residence pursuant to the terms of his probation only extended to that 
property over which he had actual or apparent control. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109; 
Barker, 136 Idaho at 730-31; Robinson, 152 Idaho at 965-66. Thus, the district court's 
conclusion that Officer Guiberson had the "authority and responsibility to search the 
home for evidence relating to possible probation violations and to determine if the 
residence continued to be safe housing" (R., p.67) is directly contrary to established 
precedent. 
Putting aside, for the moment, the question of which rooms to which 
Mr. Mclnelly's consent extended, officers could not have reasonably believed 
Mr. Mclnelly shared control over Ms. Moore's purse. Since the methamphetamine was 
found in Ms. Moore's purse, (see, e.g., R., p.64; Tr., p.26, Ls.1-7), Mr. Mclnelly's 
consent to search did not justify the officer's warrantless search of that purse. See 
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109; Barker, 136 Idaho at 730-31; Robinson, 152 Idaho at 965-
66. Therefore, absent Ms. Moore's valid consent, the search of the purse was unlawful. 
However, Mr. Mclnelly's consent to search did not even extend to the bedroom in 
which the purse was found. Officers could not reasonably believe that Mr. Mclnelly 
shared control over that bedroom. First, there were two bedrooms in the trailer home 
and some other smaller rooms. (Tr., p.55, Ls. 7-13.) Officer Guiberson indicated that 
she believed Ms. Moore, Mr. Mclnelly, and Mr. Mclnelly's son all stayed in one of the 
two bedrooms. (Tr., p.23, Ls.2-6.) However, Officer Guiberson admitted that the only 
indication that someone besides Ms. Moore stayed in Ms. Moore's room was the 
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presence of adult male clothing in the room.2 (Tr., p.33, Ls.16-20.) Additionally, Officer 
Guiberson noticed there was only one bed in Ms. Moore's bedroom. (Tr., p.23, L.6.) In 
fact, Officer Guiberson testified it would be odd for all three of them to stay in that room. 
(Tr., p.23, Ls.4-5.) Furthermore, the absence of children's clothes in that bedroom 
demonstrates that Officer Guiberson's belief that Mr. Mclnelly and his young son stayed 
in that room was not reasonable. (See Tr., p.23, Ls.2-6.) Therefore, it was not 
reasonable to believe that Mr. Mclnelly had shared control over that room or the items 
therein. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109; Barker, 136 Idaho at 730-31; Robinson, 152 
Idaho at 965-66. 
Rather, it would be reasonable to believe that, as Ms. Moore indicated, 
Mr. Mclnelly and his son would stay in another room when they were at that home. 
(See Tr., p.23, Ls.4-5.) The evidence reveals the reasonableness of that conclusion 
since there was another room furnished for Mr. Mclnelly's needs. (Tr., p.100, Ls.9-13.) 
It had two beds, one child-sized and one adult-sized. (Tr., p.100, Ls.9-13.) In fact, 
Officer Aldous testified that the teenage son who initially opened the door showed her 
some of Mr. Mclnelly's clothes in one of the other bedrooms and she observed the two 
beds in that room. (Tr., p.55, Ls.1-4.) It was also where the children's toys were 
located. (Tr., p.100, Ls.9-13.) Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
that was obviously the room over which Mr. Mclnelly had apparent control, and thus, the 
only one of the bedrooms to which his consent to search would extend. See Randolph, 
547 U.S. at 109; Barker, 136 Idaho at 730-31; Robinson, 152 Idaho at 965-66. As a 
result, Mr. Mclnelly's consent to search pursuant to the terms of his probation 
2 As Ms. Moore was married and her husband would stay in that room with her (see 
(Tr., p.100, Ls.17-24), Officer Guiberson's observation of male clothing in the room does 
not give rise to a reasonable inference that Mr. Mclnelly stayed in that room. 
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agreement does not justify the warrantless search of either Ms. Moore's bedroom or her 
purse. 
D. Ms. Moore's Consent Was Not Given Knowingly, Voluntarily, And Intelligently; It 
Was Merely Acquiescing To A Claim Of Lawful Authority 
When voluntarily granted, consent is one of the established exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). The test for whether 
consent was given freely and voluntarily given looks at the totality of the circumstances. 
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996); State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 778 (Ct. App. 
2006). There are several factors which may impact the determination of whether 
consent was voluntary, or whether it was coerced by the officers overbearing the 
defendant's will. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Garcia, 143 
Idaho at 778. Mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority does not constitute 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent, since the claim of lawful authority 
(particularly when falsely or erroneously made) is inherently coercive. 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968); State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 
112, 118 (Ct. App. 2007). Other factors which influence whether consent was 
voluntarily-given include the number of officers involved, the location, conditions, and 
time at which the consent was given, whether the individual was free to leave, and 
whether the individual knew of his/her right to deny consent are all factors which impact 
this determination. Garcia, 143 Idaho at 778. 
The totality of the circumstances indicate that Ms. Moore did not give voluntary 
consent; rather, her consent was coerced. First, the officers were searching pursuant to 
an erroneous claim of authority based on Mr. Mclnelly's probation waiver. (Tr., p.78, 
Ls.14-17; Tr., p.83, Ls.9-10; see also Tr., p.64, Ls.21-24.) As discussed in Section C, 
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supra, officers did not have lawful authority to search the area in which the evidence 
was found (Ms. Moore's purse, which was in Ms. Moore's room) pursuant to 
Mr. Mclnelly's consent pursuant to his probationary release since he did not have actual 
or apparent control over the bedroom or the purse. Ms. Moore testified that Officer 
Guiberson claimed the right to search her home pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's 
probation. (Tr., p.78, Ls.14-17; Tr., p.83, Ls.9-10.) There was no direct refutation of 
that evidence. ( See, e.g., Tr., p.46, Ls.10-15.) In fact, one of the other officers present 
indicated that his impression was that the search was being conducted pursuant to the 
terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation. (Tr., p.64, Ls.21-24.) Ms. Moore also testified that 
she consented to allow them to search for Mr. Mclnelly once Officer Guiberson told her 
that "she had the right and that she could search anywhere she wanted in my home." 
(Tr., p.78, Ls.3-21.) As such, the evidence demonstrates that Ms. Moore only 
acquiesced to a claim of lawful authority to search. Therefore, since that was an 
erroneous claim of lawful authority, any consent that Ms. Moore may have given was 
coerced, and thus, was not voluntary. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49; Tietsort, 145 Idaho 
at 118. 
Second, Officer Guiberson admitted that she had not had Ms. Moore sign any 
waiver or consent form waiving her Fourth Amendment rights as a result of having a 
probationer living in her home. (Tr., p.27, L.15 - p.28, L.1.) That is important, since 
Officer Foltz testified that, when searches are performed in these situations, the other 
officers will rely on the probation officer to confirm to which areas the waiver of the 
probationer's Fourth Amendment rights stemming from the terms of probation apply 
because it is those terms that "dictate to us where we're allowed to search." (Tr., p.71, 
Ls.1-21.) Officer Foltz also testified that the general policy is to search pursuant to 
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those terms, rather than a specific consent wavier. (Tr., p.71, Ls.22-25.) Ms. Moore 
testified that Officer Guiberson had also not informed her that such a term could apply if 
she let her son stay with her, (Tr., p.80, Ls.6-11 ), though Officer Guiberson remembered 
differently. (Tr., p.14, Ls.6-12.) However, the State bears the burden to show that this 
case falls within one of the well-delineated warrant exceptions. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 
390; Holton, 132 Idaho at 503-04. Therefore, the State has failed to prove that this 
justification is present in this case. As a result, this exception does not justify the 
warrantless search. 
Finally, the State argued below "[t]he defendant's Motion to Suppress should be 
denied because [Ms.] Moore freely and voluntarily consented to the officer's search of 
her purse and residence .... " (R., p.54.) However, a consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances reveals that was not the case. See Garcia, 143 Idaho at 778. In this 
case, there were five armed officers at Ms. Moore's residence, three of whom were 
inside her house. (Tr., p.40, Ls.8-18.) Only Ms. Moore and her teenage son were at 
home at that time. (Tr., p.51, Ls.14-17.) Officers represented to Ms. Moore that they 
could search her home pursuant to a probation waiver (Tr., p.78, Ls.14-17; Tr., p.83, 
Ls.9-10), even though, as discussed supra, officers did not actually have such a waiver 
for the areas and items within Ms. Moore's control in that residence. Nonetheless. 
based on Officer Guiberson's representation of authority, Ms. Moore was unaware that 
she could refuse consent to search, since officers were acting under the guise of the 
apparent authority of a probation waiver. Therefore, a reasonable person viewing the 
totality of the circumstances would conclude that Ms. Moore did not give voluntary 
consent to search her purse. The district court's conclusion to the contrary is erroneous 
and should be reversed. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Moore respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying her motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 1ih day of June, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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